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NFAC 4234-79

13 August 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Strategic Research

SUBJECT: Senior Review Panel (Amb. Leonhart and [redacted] only) Comments on NFAC's Research Program on Soviet Military Policies and Forces in the 1980s  
(Ref. D/OSR memo of 7 Aug 79, same subject)

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1. This response represents the views of only two members of the Panel. [redacted] is submitting his own views separately.

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2. We welcome the opportunity to comment on this important inter-office undertaking within NFAC. The program overall is very professional, comprehensive and well integrated; we take particular note of the increased attention devoted to Soviet conventional forces. Our substantive comments follow.

3. One important component of overall Soviet military policy appears to be missing from the program: Soviet arms export policy and programs. Conventional analysis of the problem tends to deal primarily with trends in the dollar costs of such programs to Third World recipients (the bibliography lists one study which compares US-Soviet arms flows to LDCs). What seems to be lacking is an indepth study of Soviet arms export policy and its relationship to overall Soviet military goals, including the economic costs and benefits as well as the military and political aspects. The study should encompass exports to Warsaw Pact countries as well as the Third World. According to NIE 11-10-79 on Soviet Military Capabilities to Project Power and Influence in Distant Areas, arms transfers are the most widely employed of the military means available to the Soviets to project influence in the Third World, and the dollar value of such exports have tripled over the last

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five years. Such exports have important commercial, as well as political and military considerations, and the Soviets have been increasingly willing to export new arms technology before they have fully equipped their own forces. Just as US arms sales abroad have become more significant to the United States in order to defray development costs, maintain production lines and earn foreign exchange, such sales are likely to become far more important to the Soviet Union in the 1980s as its economic difficulties increase.

4. A few reactions--more as questions--because the matters concerned may be implicit in one or more of the specific study proposals:

a. Does the program provide sufficiently for an examination of non-Soviet War Pact forces roles and missions--as seen by the Soviets--in their war planning? Correlatively, will there be estimative judgments on non-Soviet Pact force capabilities--political as well as technical--to perform assigned tasks? Obviously, the reliability of their Pact allies must be a key element of Soviet calculations.

b. Will the program examine the extent of Soviet dependence, if any, on non-Soviet Warsaw Pact military industrial facilities or co-production arrangements?

c. Does the program envision analysis of Soviet employment doctrine--or roles and missions--of their various forces? Their planning and capabilities for integrated or combined operations?

5. Finally, it is not clear whether the research program will undertake an analysis of Soviet planning and capabilities for intervention outside NATO in the 1980s--directly (advisors,


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supplies, communications, training, logistic support, shows of force, commitment of force, etc.) or indirectly (second and third generation proxies)--or both. Strategic air and sea lift, and amphibious forces would be particularly important aspects.



[redacted]  
William Leonhart

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cc: Dr. Bowie

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